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the potential costs of high aspirations
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Abstract
The higher our aspirations, the higher the probability that we have to
adjust them downwards when forming more realistic expectations later on.
This paper shows that the costs induced by high aspirations are not trivial.
We ﬁrst develop a theoretical framework to identify the factors that determine
the eﬀect of aspirations on expected utility. Then we present evidence from a
lab experiment on the factor found to be crucial: the adjustment of reference
states to changes in expectations. The results suggest that the costs of high
aspirations can be signiﬁcant, since reference states do not adjust quickly.
We use a novel, indirect approach that allows us to infer the determinants of
the reference state from observed behavior, rather than to rely on cheap talk.
JEL classiﬁcation: D11, D84, C91
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11 Introduction
Throughout our lives we have aspirations regarding future outcomes which are
not based on detailed information. We have a perception of our planned career
and future wealth without having reliable information on our own abilities, the
abilities of others, or the market conditions prevailing in ten years time. We may
also have a certain conception of our private life, without knowing whether we will
meet a suitable partner, or be able to sustain a close relationship in case this is
what we hope for.
When time passes by and we obtain better information, our aspirations often
have to be updated. We may learn that we can expect a better or worse job
than the one we aspired for, to earn more or less than we thought, or to have a
more or less fullﬁlling relationship than we hoped for. If we adapt to these new
expectations1 relatively quickly, initial aspirations do not inﬂuence the utility we
derive from outcomes: We do not mind having a less prestigious job or earning
less than we thought while young, or having a few more marriages than intended.
If, however, we do not adapt quickly to new expectations, but keep on comparing
outcomes to past aspirations, not meeting these aspirations will leave us disap-
pointed. Then, entertaining high aspirations that are not supported by reliable
information induces costs in expected utility, which may oﬀset the positive eﬀects
of such aspirations on, e.g., motivation or utility from anticipation.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze to what extent we have to expect such
costs. We ﬁrst derive theoretically the impact of aspirations on utility. Although
this identiﬁes several factors that determine the costs of high aspirations, it shows
that adaptation to new expectations plays a crucial role: If people adapt quickly,
no costs must be expected, irrespective of other parameters.
As the next step we run a lab experiment to test whether people do indeed quickly
adapt to new expectations. In particular, through analyzing observed behavior
we can infer whether the states people compare their outcomes to, i.e., their
reference states, adjust to changes in expectations during the experiment. The
results suggest that this is not the case, implying that the costs induced by high
aspirations are not trivial. Aiming high may hurt more than it helps.
Note that the adaptation we consider diﬀers fundamentally from what Selten
(1998) and Sauermann and Selten (1962) analyze in the Aspiration Adaptation
Theory. In particular, we do not analyze the deliberate adaptation of aspirations
to performance feedback, but the subconscious adaptation of reference states to
changes in aspirations or expectations. This means that we analyze the utility of
individuals, rather than the strategies of organizations, e.g., ﬁrms.
Although there seems to be broad agreement in the literature that utility from
(or satisfaction with) a certain outcome does not only depend on the outcome
itself, but also on what it is compared to, the details of this process are still
little understood. For example, there are plenty of suggestions on what forms the
comparison level or reference state for an outcome: one’s own previous experiences
1We will denote plans and perceptions which are based on detailed knowledge of the relevant
distribution as “expectations”, while those that are based on only vague knowledge of the distri-
bution as “aspirations”. See section 2 for details. We will not discuss compound distributions,
subjective distributions over distributions etc. in this paper.
1(status quo or habit formation, see, e.g., Campbell and Cochrane, 1999; Gomes
and Michealides, 2003), the outcomes of relevant others (social comparison, e.g.,
Abel, 1990), one’s aspirations (e.g. Simon, 1959; Ng and Wang, 2001; van Osch,
van den Hout and Stiggelbout, 2006; Lopes and Oden, 1999, McBride, 2007), or
one’s expectations (e.g., Shalev, 2000; Koszegi and Rabin, 2006). However, little
is known about what determines the relevance of these components for a certain
situation or individual, or to what extend individuals can choose what forms their
reference state.
As its contribution to this ongoing discussion, this paper focuses on the latter two
components: It analyzes how initial aspirations inﬂuence expected utility when
individuals form well-informed expectations later on. Unfortunately, in the liter-
ature there is no clear distinction between either aspirations and reference states
(see, e.g., Huck et al., 2007; McBride, 2007), or aspirations and expectations (see,
e.g., Selten, 1998 and Stutzer, 2004). Hence, some remarks about the terminology
used in this paper seem warranted. First, we will use the term reference state
to generally denote the state that an individual compares her existing state or
outcome to. Aspirations, in contrast, are one component among others that may
inﬂuence this comparison state. Some literature on aspirations deﬁnes the ref-
erence state more narrowly as one special case of the comparison level (e.g. Ng
and Wang, 2001). Our choice has two reasons. First, ”reference state” seems a
more neutral term, which simply expresses this state’s function as a comparison
level for the deﬁnition of gains and losses. Second, previous research has credi-
bly put forward components of the reference state, like habituation, which cannot
naturally be subsumed under the concept of aspirations. Hence, aspirations in
our paper are interpreted as an individual’s plans and hopes, which are not based
on detailed information. When the individual later receives detailed information,
she forms expectations. More formal deﬁnitions of the two concepts are given in
section 2.
Second, we will use the term utility and take it as a proxy for individual well-being
or happiness. We therefore abstract from problems like that of measuring ”true”
well-being (Kahneman et al., 2006), or individual failure to optimize well-being
(Hsee and Hastie, 2006). Although this is a simpliﬁcation, it seems an acceptable
approximation in our setting.
Previous empirical and experimental analyses of the reference state have usually
relied on survey studies (e.g. Stutzer, 2004). Since surveys have to rely on cheap
talk, they potentially suﬀer from untruthful statements of the subjects, both in-
tentionally and unintentionally. For example, people may want to appear less
demanding than they are, or may perceive themselves as being less materialistic
than they actually are. (On the implications of identity matters on individual
decision making and utility, see, e.g., Akerlof and Kranton, 2000.)
In this paper we chose an alternative approach, which derives the determinants
of the reference state from observed behavior. In particular, we measure subjects’
risk attitude while controlling for their expectations and previous outcomes. Since
previous research suggests a relation between feelings of loss and gain on the one
hand, and risk attitude on the other (see, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979,
Staw, 1976, Thaler and Johnson, 1990, Weber and Zuchel, 2005), this approach
allows us to infer the factors inﬂuencing individuals’ reference states from the
2factors that induce changes in their behavior towards risk. As a control, and in
order to be able to compare the two methods, we also assess individuals’ reference
states and levels of satisfaction directly in a questionnaire, that is, as cheap talk.
The results of our experiment suggest that reference states indeed take time to
adjust to expectations. Observed risk attitudes as well as self-reported reference
states depend on both, initial aspirations and new expectations. This means that
both approaches, the observed-behavior approach and the cheap-talk approach
imply that individuals do not adapt quickly to new expectations. This in turn
implies that high aspirations may lead to decreases in expected utility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 theoretically analyzes
the impact of aspirations on utility. It shows that the adaptation of aspirations de-
termines whether losses in utility can arise. The experiment to test this adaptation
is described in section 3. Section 4 shows the results, while section 5 concludes.
2 Theory
2.1 Aspirations
Let X ⊂ R be the set of possible future outcomes of the individual, with x as
its elements. For example, X may denote the income or consumption level the
individual can achieve. f(X) is the probability distribution on X.
The individual can form an aspiration xA, where xA is one element of X. In partic-
ular, the aspiration is deﬁned as the plan or perception an individual has regarding
the element of X she will receive in the future, while the information about the
distribution on X is vague. Due to this vagueness, an individual’s aspiration can
diﬀer from the expected outcome that she infers from the information available.
In particular, the aspiration can be inﬂuenced by diﬀerent ”biasing” factors, like
social comparison (Stutzer, 2004), self-image (Nauta et al., 1998; Bandura et al.,
2001, Pinquart et al., 2004), wishful thinking (Bryce and Olney, 1991) etc. These
biases distinguish aspirations from expectations, which are formed when detailed
information becomes available. Expectations are deﬁned as unbiased, i.e., they
correctly reﬂect the information available.
The relevant feature of aspirations that this deﬁnition captures is the individual’s
leeway in forming them. Although she may infer the distribution on X from the
information available, this information is vague enough for the individual’s beliefs
to deviate from the expected value of this distribution.2 This results in potential
diﬀerences between aspirations and expectations. Then, the individual’s beliefs
have to adjust from aspirations to expectations when information becomes more
detailed.
It should be noted that the focus of this paper, and the deﬁnition of aspirations
diﬀer from Selten’s (1998) Aspiration Adaptation theory. First, Selten analyzes
the adaptation of aspirations in a deliberate process of goal setting in organiza-
tions. For example, he analyzes how managers may choose a certain proﬁt target.
2Whether the deviation can deliberately be inﬂuenced by the individual or is fully determined
by the biasing factors, to our knowledge has not been well researched yet.
3In contrast, we analyze the adaptation of reference states when aspirations become
expectations, or when expectations change due to new information. For example,
a person who aimed at earning 200,000 EUR a year may realize that she will
probably never earn more than 100,000 EUR. She then has to adjust her reference
state to this expectation. This process, which must be expected to work mainly
subconsciously, is analyzed in this paper. Second, Selten’s aspirations are chosen
from the set of expected feasible outcomes, i.e., they are unbiased expectations
given some plan of action (e.g., proﬁts given the chosen marketing strategy). In
contrast, aspirations in our setup are individual and may be biased away from the
expected value, e.g., by social comparison, self-image etc.
We formalize aspirations as “based on vague information and potentially biased”
and expectations as “based on detailed information and unbiased” in the following
way. When there is only vague information, the density function on X as perceived
by the individual is relatively ﬂat, i.e., it assigns signiﬁcant probability mass to
the tails of the distribution. When more detailed information becomes available,
the density function gets narrower, that is, the tails of the distribution receive less
probability mass.
An individual’s aspiration xA is then deﬁned as being an element of X such that
the cumulative distribution function FX assigns a probability of at least ρ to
outcomes at least as good as xA:
1 − FX(xA) ≥ ρ (1)
ρ forms the cutoﬀ probability down to which the individual “believes her aspi-
rations”. It ensures that the probability of reality falling behind the individual’s
aspirations is not too high, with “too high” being determined by the individual.
The vaguer the information, the more probability mass is located at the tails, and
hence the larger is the range of outcomes for which inequality (1) is fulﬁlled. The
individual has more leeway for her aspirations to be inﬂuenced by biasing factors
like social comparison or self-image.
If the density function gets narrow enough such that the best possible realization
the individual can aspire for is below E(X) + ∆, with ∆ reﬂecting the notion
of “detailed information”, the individual’s aspiration turns into an expectation.
For ∆ = 0, the individual’s aspirations are only called expectations if they match
the expectation of X, i.e., if they are correct given the information available (see
ﬁgure 1). This is the case we consider here. However, the general argument can
be extended to the case of ∆ > 0, i.e., ”roughly correct” expectations.
Given these deﬁnitions, an individual‘s aspirations can be altered by changes in
the biasing factors or their relative weight, or by changing the cutoﬀ probability.
“Less ambitious” aspirations, for example, would be translated into a higher ρ,
that is, aspiring for a more likely, though possibly less preferred outcome.
Consider now the timing. There are three periods. In t = 1 the individual receives
only vague information and forms aspiration xA within the range speciﬁed by (1).
From this aspiration she derives anticipatory utility ua(xA), that is, utility from
looking forward to the aspired outcome (see e.g., Caplin and Leahy, 2001). In t = 2
the individual receives more detailed information and corrects her aspiration xA
to the true expectation E(X). She again derives anticipatory utility from this,
ua(E(X)). Finally, in t = 3 the individual receives outcome x as a realization of
4X. x induces absolute, that is, reference-independent utility u(x) and relative,
that is, reference-dependent utility v(x|r).











which is based on the following simplifying assumptions:
A1: Anticipatory utility is reference-independent (Matthey (2006) shows that it is
reference-dependent, but including this would not inﬂuence our main argument.)
A2: When deriving anticipatory utility, individuals consider only the absolute
utility in t = 3, i.e., they do not anticipate reference states.3 Further, they derive
utility only from anticipating the outcomes to be realized in t=3, not from antic-
ipating in t=1 the anticipatory utility in t=2.
vague information: f(X)
detailed information: f′(X)
¯ xA,ρ<0.5∗′  = E(X)
E(X) ¯ xA,ρ<0.5
Figure 1: Example of aspirations and expectations: the highest possible aspiration level
¯ xA is determined by the cutoﬀ probability ρ < 0.5. ¯ x′
A is determined by the same cutoﬀ
probability (FX(¯ xA) = F′
X(¯ x′
A)), but more detailed information. Hence, ¯ x′
A < ¯ xA. How-
ever, ¯ x′
A is still incorrect: ¯ x′
A > E(X), that is, aspirations are still biased away from the
true expectation.
3Note that there is no evidence on whether individuals actually include reference states in
anticipations or not.
52.2 Reference state
The reference-dependent utility an individual derives from an outcome x has been
speciﬁed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as v(x|r), where r is the reference that
x is compared to. In the simplest case, r can be conceptualized as a singleton. For
example, in a model of habit formation, r could be the weighted average of the
outcomes an individual received in the past. More generally, r can be modeled
as a vector, e.g. of the individual’s expectations, her aspirations, relevant others’
outcomes etc.
In our setup the individual receives the outcome in t = 3, and compares it to her
reference state in t = 3, r3. This reference state is formed in t = 1 and t = 2
when the individual ﬁrst forms aspirations xA and then expectation E(X). Since
this paper focuses on the inﬂuence of aspirations and expectations, we will ignore
all other factors that may inﬂuence the reference state like social comparison
or habituation. However, we allow these factors to inﬂuence the reference state
indirectly by inﬂuencing aspirations.
The timing is as follows. The individual enters each period with a certain reference
state. During a period she ﬁrst receives new information (if there is any). Then
she forms aspirations or expectations, depending on the quality of the information.
These factors then inﬂuence her reference state in the next period.
This sequence reﬂects the fact that reference states must be expected to require
some positive amount of time for adjustment, i.e., reference states depend on the
past, rather than the present. Letting the length of a period and the time between
periods converge to zero, this sequence can account for all speciﬁcations of the
reference formation process.4
The reference state in t = 3 can then be written as a function of the reference
state in t = 2, r2, and the individual’s aspirations and expectations:
r3 = r3 (r2, xA, E(X))
Since in our simple setup r2 can only be inﬂuenced by xA, this reduces to
r3 = r3(xA,E(X))
To further simplify the theory, we will write the reference state in t = 3 as being
formed by some linear combination of the two inﬂuencing factors (and drop the
index):
r = axA + (1 − a)E(X) with a ∈ [0,1]
The parameter a denotes the impact of aspirations in t = 1 on the reference state
in t = 3 when the individual has formed new expectations in t = 2. If the reference
state adjusts quickly to new expectations, a = 0. If a  = 0, aspirations continue
to inﬂuence the reference state for a signiﬁcant period of time even after detailed
information has led to the formation of new expectations.
4In the case of a continuous model, the present disappears, and reference states can only
possibly depend on the past. For expositional reasons, however, we develop our theory in discrete
time.
62.3 Eﬀect of aspirations on utility
High aspirations may increase the individual’s motivation to work hard, and hence
enable her to achieve better outcomes. In addition, aiming high may have a
positive signalling eﬀect on others, which by inducing support, trust etc. may also
increase the individual’s expected outcome. In order to account for such eﬀects,
we assume the following: If the aspiration xA induces the cumulative distribution
function FX over X and another aspiration x′
A induces the cumulative distribution
function GX over X, then FX ﬁrst order stochastically dominates GX if and only
if xA > x′
A (and the support of X is ﬁxed). We will call this the motivation eﬀect:
FX(x) ≤ GX(x) ∀x ⇐⇒ xA > x′
A (3)
In words, when aspirations are higher, the individual achieves an outcome distri-
bution which is at least as good as when aspirations are lower. In order to reﬂect
reality, however, we will assume the productivity of motivation (and signalling
etc.) to be subproportional: an increase of one unit in xA leads to an increase
in E(X) of less than one unit. This also implies that if aspirations increase from
x′
A to xA, and the motivation eﬀect changes the distribution function from GX
to FX, the old cutoﬀ probability ρ′ associated with aspirations x′
A and induced
by GX is higher than the new cutoﬀ probability ρ associated with aspirations xA
and induced by FX. Meeting higher aspirations is never more likely than meeting
lower aspirations: although higher aspirations increase the expected outcome, the
eﬀect is never as large as the increase in aspirations that triggered it.
It should be noted that the positive eﬀect of high aspirations on expected outcomes
is not the focus of this paper. It is included in the theory in order to provide a
more comprehensive picture of the inﬂuences of aspirations on utility, and to show
that in spite of this positive eﬀect a negative net eﬀect of high aspirations can
arise.
Including the speciﬁcation of the reference state and the motivation eﬀect, we
obtain the individual’s expected utility over periods t = 1 to t = 3 as:5






v(x|axA + (1 − a)E(X))dFX (4)







v(x|axA + (1 − a)E(X))dFX +
Z ¯ x
r
v(x|axA + (1 − a)E(X))dFX
where x and ¯ x denote the lowest and highest outcome in the support of FX,
respectively, and v(x|r > x) diﬀers from v(x|r < x) by the individual’s extend of




















5This utility is expected since even with full information X is stochastic.
















∂xA < 0. Otherwise,
aspirations should be as high as possible in order to maximize the motivation
eﬀect and anticipatory utility. Accordingly, only if the eﬀect of an increase in
aspirations on expected relative utility is negative, can an increase in aspirations
lead to a decrease in utility. Hence, if we can rule out a negative eﬀect of xA on R
x v(x|r), no costs of high aspirations on individual utility must be expected.
The eﬀect of an increase in aspirations on relative utility has two opposing com-
ponents. First, similar to the eﬀect on ua and u, the new distribution function




v(x|axA + (1 − a)E(X))dFX
∂E(X)
> 0
Second, for a > 0, an increase in xA increases the reference state, which reduces ex-
pected utility.6 For outcomes above the increased reference state utility decreases
but is positive, for outcomes between the original and the increased reference state
former gains turn into losses, while for outcomes below the original reference state
existing losses become even larger. Hence,
∂
R
v(x|axA + (1 − a)E(X))dFX
∂r
< 0
Accordingly, the net eﬀect of an increase in aspirations on relative utility is am-
bivalent: On the one hand, utility is increased by the motivation eﬀect. On the
other, it is decreased by the inﬂuence of initial aspirations on the reference state
and by the degree of loss aversion (the diﬀerence in utility functions for losses and
gains). However, if a = 0, i.e, reference states quickly adjust to new expectations,
relative utility is zero, and the eﬀect of high aspirations on expected utility is
unambiguously positive (no local optimum).
The question whether the reference state quickly adjusts to new expectations, i.e.,
whether a = 0, is addressed by the experiment described in the next section. This
shows whether high aspirations can lead to losses in utility.
3 Experiment
3.1 Design
The experiment consisted of four stages that were played once by each subject.
In the invitation to the experiment it was written that the experiment would last
about one hour and that participants would earn 12 Euro on average.
6The increase in xA also increases the reference state through increasing E(X), but by deﬁ-
nition of r this eﬀect never increases r above E(X).
8At the ﬁrst stage, subjects stated a price for which they would have been prepared
to abstain from the experiment. This serves as a proxy for their initial aspirations,
and is denoted with ASP. The price was assessed through an interval method:
As the ﬁrst step, all subjects were asked whether they would abstain from the
experiment if they instead received 15 Euro, but had to stay in the lab. Those
who preferred the money were oﬀered a lower price next. Those who preferred to
take part in the experiment were oﬀered a higher price next. This method was
continued until subjects had speciﬁed their preferences up to one Euro cent. The
interval method was explained in detail in the instructions, and a quiz ensured
that all students had understood it. It was used for all prices we assessed during
the experiment. It was also clearly stated that at some stages the assessed prices
would not be paid out. If they were to be paid out, this was clearly indicated
before the respective decision.
At the second stage, subjects were informed that they would later participate in a
lottery. Half of the subjects received a lottery that would pay either 10 or 12 Euro
with equal probability. The other half received a lottery that would pay either 1 or
3 Euro with equal probability. From this they could easily calculate the expected
payoﬀs from their lotteries, EPL1. Subjects did not know what lottery the other
participants received, or whether they received a lottery at all. After all subjects
had learnt the features of their lottery, they had to perform a logical task. This
task - completing series of numbers - lasted for 10 minutes. It was included in
order to give the participants time to adjust their reference state to the expected
payoﬀ from the lottery they would take part in. Then they were asked for their
certainty equivalent of the lottery they had received. From this we calculated
the risk premium, RP1, as the diﬀerence between expected payoﬀ and certainty
equivalent.7 Afterwards, the lotteries were played out and subjects received their
payoﬀs, PAYL1, i.e., 1, 3, 10 or 12 Euro. This determined their nominal loss or
gain, GoLL1: Individuals who received either 1 or 10 Euro lost relative to the
expected payoﬀ from their lottery, while individuals who received either 3 or 12
Euro won. Note that for this lottery certainty equivalents were not paid out.
At the third stage, subjects received a second lottery, which was the same for all.
In this lottery, subjects would either have to pay 1 Euro from their previous payoﬀs
or be paid 7 Euro extra with equal probability.8 We then assessed the subjects’
certainty equivalent for this second lottery. The risk premium indicated by this
choice is denoted RP2. Next, we used a Becker-DeGroot-Marshak mechanism to
determine whether subjects would receive their certainty equivalent or the payoﬀ
from the lottery. The participants who took part in the lottery then ﬂipped a coin,
which determined their payoﬀ. The others received their certainty equivalent. The
payoﬀ from the second lottery, PAYL2, was then added to the one from the ﬁrst
lottery.
Finally, at the fourth stage we asked our subjects, which payoﬀ from the experi-
ment they would have been satisﬁed with. This payoﬀ is used as a (cheap talk)
7Terms like ”certainty equivalent”, ”price” etc. were not used in the experiment. See the
appendix for a translated version of the instructions.
8That subjects can make nominal losses here is not a problem since all subjects received the
same lottery, and risk attitudes were analyzed relative to other subjects, rather than in absolute
terms.
9proxy for their reference state at the end of the experiment, REF.
After the experiment had ended subjects ﬁlled in a questionnaire. There, they
were asked how satisﬁed they had felt with their payoﬀ from the ﬁrst lottery
(SatisfactionL1). As usually, we also collected data on age, gender, subject of
study and previous experience with experiments.
48 students of either Technical University Berlin or Humboldt University Berlin
participated in the experiment. The sessions took place at Technical University
Berlin in December 2006. The software used to conduct the experiments was z-tree
(Fischbacher, 1999).
3.2 Hypotheses
The design of the experiment can be interpreted in terms of the theory as follows:
t = 1 is the time when people enter the lab. At that moment they have already
formed aspirations regarding their payoﬀ from the experiment. Although we did
give our subjects some information on the expected payoﬀ from the experiment
(12 EUR), aspirations as indicated by ASP diﬀer widely. There are several pos-
sible reasons for that. First, people may not have noticed the information in the
invitation regarding the expected payoﬀ and instead derived their aspirations from
some more general distribution. Second, they may have discounted the relevance
of the information as being general information regarding the experiments that
take place in the lab. Third, in the months before our experiment, several other
experiments took place in the lab. Our participants may have participated in these
experiments or may have heard from others who participated, and then extrapo-
lated from average payoﬀs there. Forth, since the payoﬀ from the experiment is
uncertain when ASP is assessed, people may subtract a risk premium from their
true aspirations. Fifth, the amount people state may include compensation for
the utility they would derive from their participation in the experiment, that is,
the fun of gambling.9
t = 2 is the time when subjects receive information on the lottery they are going
to participate in. The duration of the logical task is the period between t = 2
and t = 3, when reference states have time to adapt to the change from the
individual’s initial aspirations to the new expectations. Although this time is not
too long (10 minutes), it was not short relative to the overall duration of the
experiment (about 1h) or in relation to the amount of money involved. Further,
due to some other tasks (e.g., determination of the certainty equivalent) the true
time between forming expectations about the lottery and actually receiving the
payoﬀ was about 15 minutes. Finally, PAYL1 is the individual’s outcome in t = 3.
The second lottery in the experiment serves to measure the risk attitudes of the
individuals after the ﬁrst lottery, in order to infer the variables that inﬂuence their
reference states. In particular, we want to know whether ASP and EPL1 inﬂuence
the reference states, that is, individuals’ risk attitudes. This step warrants some
more explanation.
9For some people, this utility may have been negative, if they enjoy writing emails or reading
a book more than participating in the experiment.
10Previous research implied that people’s risk attitude depends on whether they
are in the domain of losses or gains. In diﬀerent contexts, individual’s have been
found to react diﬀerently to risk, depending on whether they have previously made
losses or gains, or depending on whether they expect to make losses or gains. Staw
(1976) observed behavior he calls “escalation of commitment”, where losses in past
situations lead to higher risk taking than gains. In similar, i.e., sequential situ-
ations, Thaler and Johnson (1990) ﬁnd the opposite: after making gains, people
become more risk averse, a behavior the authors term the “housemoney eﬀect”.
A recent study by Weber and Zuchel (2005) indicates that the opposing eﬀects
may arise as a result of diﬀerent frames of the decision situation. This would also
be consistent with the ﬁnding of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) that when facing
losses, people become more risk loving than when facing gains.
What these results have in common is that depending on whether people experi-
ence/expect a loss or a gain, they react diﬀerently to risk. Hence, the factors that
inﬂuence people’s sentiment of loss and gain also inﬂuence their risk behavior.
This is what matters for our approach. Any sentiment of loss or gain depends
on three factors: First, a person’s actual payoﬀ. Second, her reference state. To-
gether, these form the ”objective” gain or loss. Third, her individual experience
of this objective gain or loss, i.e., her degree of loss aversion. This forms her ”sub-
jective” gain or loss, that is, her utility from winning or losing. In the experiment,
the objective gain or loss in t = 3 is determined by the subjects’ payoﬀs PAYL1
and their reference states. Their subjective gain or loss is approximated by asking
for their satisfaction with the outcomes of the lottery, SatisfactionL1. Note that
since ’SatisfactionL1’ was only assessed at the end of the experiment, it may suﬀer
from hindsight bias. This had to be accepted since asking for subjects’ satisfac-
tion during the experiment would have focused their attention on their level of
satisfaction, which could have biased the results.
From this we can derive the following prediction: If the individual’s reference state
in t = 3, i.e., when the ﬁrst lottery is played out, is determined by the expected
payoﬀ from this lottery, her feeling of loss or gain depends on whether she gets
the high (3 or 12 Euro) or the low (1 or 10 Euro) payoﬀ in her respective lottery.
Accordingly, her risk attitude in the second lottery, RP2, should be inﬂuenced
by whether she won or lost within her respective lottery (GoLL1). If, however,
the individual’s reference state in t = 3 is determined by her initial aspirations,
whether she experiences a loss or a gain depends on whether she gets a high (10
or 12 Euro) or a low (1 or 3 Euro) payoﬀ relative to her aspirations. In this case,
her risk attitude in the second lottery should be inﬂuenced by her aspirations and
by whether she received the good or the bad lottery, i.e., the expected payoﬀ from
her lottery.
Our hypotheses can then be formulated as follows:
Hypothesis 1: The risk premium in the second lottery does not depend on
whether subjects received a loss or a gain in the ﬁrst lottery, relative to the ex-
pected payoﬀ from this lottery.
If Hypothesis 1 is rejected, the new expectations inﬂuence people’s reference state
in the 10 minutes of the logical task. This would mean that there is at least some
adaptation to new expectations within reasonable time, i.e., a < 1.
11Hypothesis 2: The risk premium in the second lottery does not depend on
subjects’ initial aspirations and their expected payoﬀ in the ﬁrst lottery.
If Hypothesis 2 is rejected, people’s initial aspirations continue to inﬂuence their
reference states even after the 10 minutes of the logical task. This would mean
that adaptation to new expectations requires considerable time, i.e., a > 0.
Note again that the link between people’s reference states and the hypotheses is
based on the assumption of a relationship between feelings of gain and loss and
risk attitude. Although the details of this link are not crucial for our argument,
some relation has to be assumed.
Finally, asking subjects at the very end for the amount they would have found
”satisfactory” served as a control for the cheap talk method of assessing reference
states. In contrast to the initial aspirations, this amount includes neither a risk
premium nor a gambling premium. In this sense, it is a cleaner proxy for the
reference state at the end, than ASP is for the aspirations at the beginning. How-
ever, since subjects already knew their payoﬀs at the time we assessed REF, some
endowment eﬀects may have been included, and hindsight bias may be present.
4 Results
To test our hypotheses, we regress the risk premium of the second lottery on the
individuals’ initial aspirations (ASP), the diﬀerence between these aspirations and
the expected payoﬀ in the ﬁrst lottery (DIFFL1), the indicator of nominal gains
and losses in the ﬁrst lottery (GoLL1), the risk premium in the ﬁrst lottery (RP1)
and the level of satisfaction with the ﬁrst lottery (SatisfactionL1), see table 1 (OLS










Table 1: Regression for the risk premium of the second lottery (robust standard
errors, R-squared = 0.2691).
In DIFFL1 we include the expected payoﬀ EPL1 rather than the received payoﬀ
PayL1 in order to avoid that the level of the payoﬀ (high or low) enters the
regression together with losses and gains in the lottery. Hence, the diﬀerence
between EPL1 and ASP is a proxy for the objective gain or loss that an individual
receives, without accounting for losses and gains relative to the expected payoﬀ
from the lottery. We also include the subjects’ stated satisfaction with the payoﬀ
12from the ﬁrst lottery (SatisfactionL1).10 As explained above, given a certain
reference state and level of payoﬀ in the ﬁrst lottery, i.e., given an objective loss
or gain, due to diﬀerent degrees of loss aversion not all individuals will experience
the same feeling of loss or gain. But this subjective loss or gain must be expected
to inﬂuence behavior.
We include the risk premium of the ﬁrst lottery, RP1, to account for the indi-
vidual’s general risk attitude. Furthermore, we test whether subjects who have
already taken part in an experiment before (Experience) react diﬀerently from
those who have not. As our subject pool contains some students of economics, we
also control for this characteristic (Econ).
We ﬁnd that the initial aspirations (ASP), the diﬀerence between aspirations and
expected payoﬀ (DIFFL1), the satisfaction with the ﬁrst lottery (SatisfactionL1)
and the nominal gain or loss (GoLL1) are relevant for the determination of the risk
premium in the second lottery and hence for the reference state. This means that
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 can both be rejected (at the 10% and 5% signiﬁcance
level, respectively). Accordingly, our results suggest that 0 < a < 1.
Note that the coeﬃcient of the risk premium of the ﬁrst lottery is not signiﬁcant.
This is presumably due to the fact that part of the general risk attitude is captured
in ASP, which dilutes the impact of RP1. The coeﬃcient of the subjects studying
economics is not signiﬁcant either; hence, we do not have to worry about this
group. Experience with experiments seems to play a role, though, by slightly
decreasing individuals’ risk aversion.
Consider now the second approach to understanding how the reference state
changes during the experiment, i.e. the assessment of REF through cheap talk at







Table 2: Regression for the ﬁnal reference state (robust standard errors,
R-squared = 0.4659).
The results support those of the ﬁrst approach. The initial aspirations continue
inﬂuencing the reference state at the end, but it is also eﬀected by the payoﬀs
received during the experiment. The second point, however, must be interpreted
with care. Since REF was assessed after the subjects had learnt their payoﬀs,
endowment eﬀects may play a role. It is therefore hard to distinguish whether the
expectations regarding their ﬁnal payoﬀs have inﬂuenced individual’s reference
state, or whether the payoﬀs they received on paper (not in cash yet) have led
to an endowment eﬀect. However, the highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of ASP shows
clearly that a > 0 when reference states are assessed through cheap talk.
10Although this may potentially induce a problem of endogeneity.
13This latter result is also supported by the analysis of the subjects’ level of satis-






Table 3: Regression for the satisfaction with the payoﬀs from the ﬁrst lottery
(robust standard errors, R-squared = 0.4685 ).
The regression shows that the satisfaction level after the ﬁrst lottery is again
determined by the individual’s initial aspirations, the diﬀerence between these
aspirations and the expected payoﬀ from their lottery, and whether they gained
or lost in their respective lottery. It is also strongly inﬂuenced by the constant, i.e.
individuals seem to have an inherent level of satisfaction that is relatively inert
and cannot be explained by our regressors. This means that they react diﬀerently
to nominal losses or gains, e.g., due to diﬀerent degrees of loss aversion, which
explains the inﬂuence of SatisfactionL1 in the regression for RP2.
In summary, the experiment provides strong evidence against the hypothesis that
aspirations do not inﬂuence reference states after new expectations are formed,
i.e., we ﬁnd that a > 0. It also gives some evidence that people do adjust their
reference states to new expectations, although at a moderate speed: a < 1.
5 Conclusion
Aiming high and working hard is the chosen path of many people in industrialized
countries. This paper shows that there may be a cost involved in this approach.
We ﬁrst show theoretically that if people do not quickly adapt to new expectations,
high aspirations can induce losses in expected utility. Although other parameters
can be relevant for the size of the reduction in utility, whether adaptation happens
quickly is shown to determine whether there is potential for losses or not.
As the next step, we use a lab experiment to test whether reference states indeed
adapt quickly when expectations change. The results indicate that this is not the
case, which implies that there is a potential for signiﬁcant losses in utility when
people maintain high aspirations.
Our results also show that additional research concerning the formation of refer-
ence states is needed, as reference states cannot be explained with expectations
alone. Since aspirations are found to inﬂuence reference states beyond the forma-




The following experiment is part of a research project which is ﬁnanced by the
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation). It aims at
analysing economic decision behaviour.
You can earn a considerable amount of money within this experiment. The amount
of money depends on your decisions. Hence, it is very important to read these
instructions carefully and thoroughly.
Please note that these instructions are only intended for you. You are not allowed
to circulate any information to other participants. By the same token you are not
allowed to talk to other participants during the whole experiment. If you have any
questions please raise your hand. We will then pass by and answer your question.
Please do not ask your question(s) aloud in any case. If you violate these rules we
are forced to cancel the experiment.
Procedure
The experiment lasts for about 60min. It consists of several parts. In each of these
parts you solve problems or make decisions. In each case, the respective decisions
and problems will be carefully explained on the screen. Please note that your
experiment’s payoﬀ does not only depend on your decisions. It is also inﬂuenced
by random decisions made by the computer.
Not all of your decisions inﬂuence the amount of money that is paid out to you at
the end of the experiment. If the decisions’ results are paid out this is explicitly
announced before you make these decisions. The other decisions and problems are
not relevant for your payoﬀ.
All ﬁgures in the decisions that are relevant for your payoﬀ are given in Euro.
They are paid out to you in exactly the given amount at the end of the experiment.
Additionally, you receive 3 Euro for your participation.
Lotteries
Two times in the experiment you can take part in a lottery. You receive payoﬀs
from these two lotteries. In each of the two lotteries there are two diﬀerent payoﬀs,
a higher and a lower one. In each case, you receive only one of these payoﬀs. Which
payoﬀ you receive depends on chance. The chance to receive the higher payoﬀ is
as big as the chance to receive the lower payoﬀ. This can be visualised as follows:
In a big pot there are 100 balls. Out of these 100 balls 50 balls are white and 50
balls are black. By chance, one single ball is drawn out of the pot. If this ball is
white you get the higher payoﬀ. If the ball is black you get the lower payoﬀ.
For example, if the lottery is a lottery in which you can earn either 5 or 10 Euro,
you can imagine the following: If a white ball is drawn out of the pot with 100
balls, you will receive 5 Euro. If a black ball is drawn out of the pot with 100
balls, you will receive 10 Euro.
15Decision process
After you have been oﬀered a lottery within the experiment, we ask you which
ﬁxed amount of money we would have to oﬀer you so that you are willing to
abstain from participating in the lottery. Your decision between the participation
in the lottery and the ﬁxed amount of money is taken according to a procedure
that will be explained to you in detail in the following.
Let us assume - like in the example above - that you can receive either 5 or 10
Euro in the lottery. The chance that you receive 5 Euro is thereby as big as the
chance that you receive 10 Euro. Please note that this lottery is only an example.
It does not show up in the experiment!
First of all we ask you whether you would abstain from participating in the lottery
if you could receive a ﬁxed amount of money of 7.50 Euro instead. If you prefer
receiving 7.50 Euro to participating in the lottery, then click on ”yes”. If you
prefer participating in the lottery to receiving 7.50 Euro, then click on ”no”.
The next question is very similar to the ﬁrst one. The only diﬀerence is that now
you are not oﬀered 7.50 Euro but another ﬁxed amount of money. For example, we
oﬀer you 8.75 Euro or 6.25 Euro in the second step. We then again ask you whether
you would be ready to abstain from the lottery for a ﬁxed amount of money of
8.75 Euro or 6.25 Euro, respectively. If you prefer receiving this amount of money
to participating in the lottery, then click on ”yes”. If you prefer participating in
the lottery to receiving 8.75 Euro or 6.25 Euro, respectively, then click on ”no”.
These questions are repeated according to this schema several times, whereat we
oﬀer you diﬀerent ﬁxed amounts of money. All these amounts of money are at
least as big as the lower payoﬀ of the lottery. And they are not exceeding the
higher payoﬀ of the lottery. For the lottery in the example, in which you either
receive 5 or 10 Euro, this means: The ﬁxed amounts of money that we oﬀer you
for abstaining from the lottery vary between 5 and 10 Euro.
In the ﬁrst lottery in the experiment we would only like to know for which ﬁxed
amount of money you would be ready to abstain from the lottery. However, in
any case, you participate in the lottery.
In the second lottery you can eﬀectively abstain from your participation in the
lottery. You then receive a ﬁxed amount of money. For this purpose we identify
the price against which we ”exchange” the lottery. This is done according to a
certain mechanism which is explained in the following paragraph.
Determination of the exchange price
First, the computer randomly determines the price for which we exchange the
lottery. This price lies in the same range as the amounts of money you are oﬀered
during the decision process. For the lottery in the example, this means that the
price lies in the range between 5 and 10 Euro.
All amounts in this range have the same chance to be drawn as exchange price.
This means the chance that the price is 6.00 Euro is just as high as the chance
that it is 8.43 Euro. But it also means that the chance that the price is above 8.43
Euro is far smaller than the chance that it is above 6.00 Euro. This is because
there are far more possible prices between 6.00 Euro and 10.00 Euro than between
8.43 Euro and 10.00 Euro.
16The decisive question is then the following: In the decision process, did you abstain
from the lottery at an amount which was below or just as high as the price? If
yes, you will receive the price and not participate in the lottery. If not, you will
not receive the price, but participate in the lottery. You will then receive the low
or the high payoﬀ with equal chance.
Consider again the lottery in the example, in which you receive either 5 or 10 Euro.
Assume that a price of 6.23 Euro is drawn. When asked whether you wanted to
abstain from the lottery for an amount of 6.23 Euro or less - did you choose the
ﬁxed amount? Then you will receive 6.23 Euro and not participate in the lottery.
Did you choose the lottery? Then you will not receive the 6.23 Euro. You will
participate in the lottery and have equal chances to receive 5 or 10 Euro.
Note! If you do not participate in the lottery, you do not receive the lowest
amount at which you abstained from the lottery. You receive the price that the
computer draws randomly. This means that all participants in the experiment
who do not participate in the lottery receive the same amount of money! This
means that your choice to abstain from the lottery in exchange for a certain ﬁxed
amount does not determine the size of the ﬁxed amount you receive. It determines
the chance that you receive the price that the computer determines, rather than
to participate in the lottery. If you abstain from the lottery at lower amounts, you
increase the chance to receive the price and do not participate in the lottery. If
you abstain from the lottery only at higher amounts, you increase the chance to
not receive the price but participate in the lottery.
The described mechanism is called Becker-DeGroot-Marshak mechanism. With
this mechanism it is optimal for you to state honestly for every ﬁxed amount
whether you prefer to participate in the lottery or to receive the ﬁxed amount.
We will now give you more examples of the mechanism.
Example 1:
You can participate in a lottery in which you have equal chances to either have
to pay 2 Euro or receive 12 Euro. You decided to abstain from the lottery for all
ﬁxed amounts higher than or equal to 3 Euro. For ﬁxed amounts below 3 Euro
you preferred to participate in the lottery.
1. The computer randomly draws a price of 4.50 Euro. Since for this amount
you decided to abstain from the lottery you receive the price of 4.50 Euro and do
not participate in the lottery. 2. The computer randomly draws a price of 1.35
Euro. Since for this amount you preferred to participate in the lottery, you do not
receive the price. You participate in the lottery, and either pay 2 Euro or receive
12 Euro. Both with equal chance.
Example 2:
You can again participate in a lottery in which you have equal chances to either
have to pay 2 Euro or receive 12 Euro. You decided to abstain from the lottery
for all ﬁxed amounts higher than -0.50 Euro. For ﬁxed amounts below -0.50 Euro
you preferred to participate in the lottery.
1. The computer randomly draws a price of -0.70 Euro. For this amount you pre-
ferred to participate in the lottery and not receive the ﬁxed amount. Accordingly,
17you do not pay the price of 0.70 Euro. You participate in the lottery, and either
pay 2 Euro or receive 12 Euro. 2. The computer randomly draws a price of -0.35
Euro. For this amount you decided to rather pay the price and abstain from the
lottery. Accordingly, you pay the price of 0.35 Euro and do not participate in the
lottery.
As mentioned before, the exchange price is only drawn for your decision regarding
the second lottery. For the ﬁrst lottery you merely complete the decision process
as described above. You will complete this decision process in two more parts of
the experiment. The decisions you have to make there are described in detail in
due time.
Please complete now carefully the questions below, to ensure that you understood
the described procedures.
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